The Educational Potential of Heidegger’s Theory of Imagination (2):
On Kant’s Critique of Judgment

WATANABE Hideyuki

Following on from my previous paper, “The Educational Potential of Heidegger’s Theory of Imagination: On His Interpretation of the Schematism,” this study seeks to further elucidate the potential of imagination by taking as a guide Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant together with the latter’s theory of imagination. To highlight the key points of these central themes I have given Part 2 a separate subtitle, but it is effectively a continuation of Part 1, and at the risk of some repetition the analysis of Part 1 is recapitulated here.

In Part 1, we saw that the fundamental role of imagination lies in its mediating function, or bridging the gap between knowledge and sensation; further, based on Heidegger’s ontology, we identified a horizon for thinking about Being itself. But the actual workings of the imagination cannot be elucidated within a frame of reference provided by the fundamental issues of transcendentalism, because they are also intimately related to perception, sensation, and emotion. Thus, with Kant’s Critique of Judgment as a guide, in this paper I further examine the schematizing function of imagination in light of concrete emotional experience.

First, I assign a broader significance to the fundamental role of imagination by relating its schematizing function to temporality.

Next, I investigate imagination’s potential in a narrow sense along the lines permitted by the constitution of judgment, taking the Critique of Judgment as a guide.

Developing this approach, I point lastly to the real potential of the theory of imagination itself as a challenge to the impossible, and present an overview of the theory’s educational potential.