The Educational Potential of Heidegger’s Theory of Imagination: On His Interpretation of the Schematism

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During the Marburg years, Heidegger accused Kant of having retreated, in the second edition of *A Critique of Pure Reason*, from assigning to transcendental imagination the fundamental role it had in the first edition. However, as Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant took a more ontological turn the idea of imagination eventually receded into the background of his work, and this might tend to cast doubt on his earlier position. Yet if the power of imagination is to be equated with time itself, the identity between the theory of imagination and the theory of time must surely be pivotal to ontological inquiry. This paper seeks to explore the significance of Heidegger’s theory of imagination—particularly its absence in his later work—and to investigate the theory’s ontological potential in the attempt to create an original horizon. At the heart of this examination are the functions of the schemata situated between intuition and concept. The unique ontological potential of these functions is demonstrated by examining the differences in significance assigned to each of them.

Taking the interpretation of "The Analytic of Principles” in *A Critique of Pure Reason* as my main focus, I first elucidate Heidegger’s critique of Kant’s schematism and then make clear the potential of Heidegger’s interpretation of the theory of the Principles, which [leaves no room for?] the theory of imagination; lastly, I show that the potential of the theory of imagination lies in the creation of an original horizon via the function of the schemata.

These explorations offer the possibility of further development in the area of creating pedagogical tasks.